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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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March 1, 1982

Senior Interagency Group No. 17

TO: :
OVP	-	Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC	-	Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
DOD	-	COL John Stanford
JCS	-	LTC Edward Bucknell
CIA	-	[redacted] STAT
Treasury	-	Mr. David Pickford
ACDA	-	Mr. Joseph Presel

SUBJECT: NATO Summit Preparations

Attached you will find the papers for consideration at the Wednesday, March 3, meeting of the Senior Interagency Group on NATO Summit preparations.

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
1. Agenda
2. Discussion Paper
3. Work Program
4. Calendar of Relevant Events

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AGENDA FOR MARCH 3 SIG

1. Opening Remarks by Chairman.

2. General discussion of Summit:

   A. Outcome.

   B. Timing (Relationship to Versailles).

   C. Building Blocks.

      I. Political Elements:

         (1) NATO's Image.

         (2) East-West Relations.

         (3) East-West Trade and Tech Transfer.

         (4) Out-of-Area Issues/Global Concerns.

         (5) U.S. Commitment to NATO.

         (6) Directions for the Alliance in the 80's.

      II. Arms Control:

         (1) INF.

         (2) START.

         (3) MBFR.

         (4) CDE.

      III. Defense.

3. Work Program/Calendar.

4. Constitution of IG.

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SIG DISCUSSION PAPER

THE NATO SUMMIT: AN ATLANTIC AGENDA FOR THE 1980's

The Summit will, first of all, be a forum which focuses major attention on the leadership of the Alliance. In this, his first NATO meeting, the US President will occupy center stage. His influence will be a powerful instrument for achieving the substantive results we seek; the success or failure of the Summit will be measured by the extent to which he is judged to have achieved his goals. The Summit is thus in every sense of the word a Presidential show. It is therefore essential that the US emerge from it as the confident leader of a unified Alliance.

This is all the more important in that the NATO Summit will take place against the background of serious and growing differences within the Alliance on a number of economic, defense and foreign policy issues. In this policy context, the Summit is an opportunity to focus on areas where there is a convergence of views within the Alliance, to advance agreement to the extent possible and to lay the foundation for greater Alliance consensus in the future. The public message should be the Alliance's continuing vitality and relevance to the issues of the 1980's, as well as its enduring unity on fundamental values. A strong message along these lines will be important for its impact on three key audiences: the US, Europe and the USSR.

Outcome

Against this background, we should work to achieve the following specific outcomes at the Summit:

--Summit endorsement of the framework of global restraint and responsibility as an overall Alliance objective. This framework has been endorsed by the last two NATO Foreign Ministers' meetings; it groups defense, global concerns and arms control in a way that puts the Allies on record as sharply critical of Soviet behavior and moves away from the detente-defense balance of the Harmel Report, without directly challenging a concept to which many European leaders remain committed.

--To point the Alliance in the direction of the 1980's and a hard look at the problems and opportunities which face it. An issue for consideration is how specific an outcome we should seek in this regard; one possibility would be Summit endorsement for a Wise Men's study on future directions in the Alliance (not to include detailed defense analysis).

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--To make conventional defense issues a major focus of the Summit. Possible outcomes include a Summit Statement of Principles for Current and Future Conventional Defense efforts or, alternately, a mandate for a broad conventional defense review (see below).

Timing

In planning for the NATO Summit, we need to bear in mind that it will be immediately preceded by the Versailles Economic Summit. It is important that neither Summit overshadow the other (particularly since not all the NATO Allies will participate in Versailles). Moreover, the treatment of certain issues at Versailles (for example, East-West trade) will affect not only how they are handled at Bonn, but to some degree the atmospherics as well.

Building Blocks

To achieve the outcomes we want, we have at our disposal the following building blocks:

I. Political Issues

1. NATO's Image: The Summit should project an image of Alliance vitality and relevance. Assuming the necessary ratification procedures are completed in time, Spain's entry into NATO will be the major event in this regard--a symbol of a vigorous, growing Alliance. We should also highlight NATO's enduring common commitment to peace through security and to fundamental Western values.

2. East-West Relations. In all likelihood, Poland will be a major subject for discussion at the Summit. We will want to highlight the common elements of the Alliance position and focus on what has been achieved. Whether we will also want to seek further movement on sanctions will depend on circumstances, including the treatment of the sanctions issue at the Versailles Summit.

Beyond Poland, the Summit declaration should focus on the outlines of East-West relations for the 1980's, building on the framework of global restraint and responsibility developed at the last two Foreign Ministers' meetings. This will link defense, global concerns and arms control in the context of a generally critical Allied stance on Soviet behavior. It will also continue the shift in Alliance statements away from the Harmel Report's equibalanced emphasis on defense and detente.

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3. Out-Of-Area Issues and Global Concerns. Building on the heightened Allied concern over out-of area threats to the Alliance that has evolved over the past two years as a result of Afghanistan and other objectionable Soviet behavior, and using our overall framework of global restraint and responsibility, we will want explicit recognition by the Summit of this threat. Specifically, we should seek language in the Summit declaration endorsing individual or collective Alliance efforts which contribute to out-of-area stability and to Western and regional security. We should continue to nudge the Allies on the specific areas where we have sought increased cooperation from them. However, we also wish to avoid divisive debate at the Summit on issues where we continue to have important differences--for example, the Arab-Israeli dispute, El Salvador and Libya.

4. The US Commitment to NATO. A reaffirmation of the full U.S. commitment to Europe's defense and security for the 1980's should be a major feature of the Summit. It would represent a powerful marker that the US, 35 years after the Marshall plan, remains wedded to an Alliance rather than a unilateral course--in our own national interest as well as for the sake of the Allies. We will want such an affirmation to be in the context of solid Allied support by all for stronger NATO defense.

5. Directions for the Alliance in the 1980's. The Summit should convey a sense of a forward-looking Alliance--that is, an Alliance willing to take a close fresh look at the concerns that will face it during the 1980's. As noted above, this could be accomplished in a number of ways: one would be to have the Summit call for a Wise Men's study of future directions in the Alliance; such an undertaking could deal with broad questions of the Alliance's role in the 1980's and beyond: for example, NATO's approach to the Soviet Union and East-West relations; relations of Allies with the Third World; consultative modalities; NATO and the public, etc. (but not detailed defense analysis).

II. Defense

Conventional defense should be a major focus of the Summit, with the need for a greater common Allied undertaking and the relevance of conventional efforts to raising the nuclear threshold as important underlying themes. Whether or not to seek specific increased commitments at that time is a question we need to answer. In any case, we should seek to lay the groundwork for a sustained future effort.

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As regards specific Summit outcomes, several are possible. One would be a Summit Statement of Principles for current and future conventional defense efforts, which could encompass burden sharing, defense spending levels, RSI, defense equipment cooperation, and improved planning. Another would be to have the Summit mandate a broad review of NATO's conventional defense posture designed to explore improved ways to implement NATO's strategy of forward defense.

III. Arms Control

Whether we will want significant arms control outcomes at the Summit will depend to a large degree on the situation in Poland at that time. Certain of our Allies will have a strong interest in an arms control outcome; the Bonn venue will make this particularly compelling for the Germans. In addition, the near simultaneous meeting of the SSOD will guarantee a major public focus on arms control (Schmidt himself will be going a few days after the Summit). Below are some possible building blocks for an arms control outcome; other initiatives can be considered as appropriate:

1. INF. While INF should not be a major focus of Summit attention, the Summit should sustain the momentum of the President's November 18 INF proposal. A possible outcome, if it would be helpful in the context of Allied unity, would be Summit endorsement to the basic principles of our negotiating approach, particularly those where we anticipate eventual European pressure to compromise (i.e. global vs. regional limits; non-inclusion of third country systems; focus on missiles). In parallel with any endorsement of our negotiating approach, the Summit declaration should also contain a reaffirmation of the modernization track, along the lines of the Gleneagles formula.

2. START. Events in Poland, will, of course be a determining factor on this question. If the decision to begin START negotiations is made before June, the announcement should be timed for maximum impact at the Summit. An announcement made shortly beforehand, perhaps in the President's Westminster speech, could help secure European support for our other Summit objectives and dampen charges from the Europeans that this Administration is uninterested in arms control.

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3. MBFR. We may be in a position to move forward the new approach to MBFR which we are now exploring with the UK and FRG. This would link any initial US-Soviet reduction to a commitment to subsequent, more substiantial reductions leading to the common ceiling--thus ensuring militarily significant and advantageous results. This would give the Alliance an initiative in the conventional arms control area and might in succeeding months deflect some of the pressure from the INF negotiations. However, any new MBFR initiative would have to be carefully considered in the context of the current Polish situation. It should, in addition, be carefully integrated with whatever outcomes we seek on conventional defense.

4. CDE. By June, CSCE will probably be in recess, with plans to reconvene in the fall. There may be pressure from some of the Allies to say something positive at the Summit about CDE. We should insist that any such statement make clear the link to the situation in Poland (and of course the need for balance on human rights).

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NATO SUMMIT
SIG/IG WORK PROGRAM

COMPLETION	TASK	RESPONSIBILITY	COMMENT
March 3	1st SIG meeting		
March 8	Circulate for IG: 1. Congr. game plan 2. Draft Summit Decl. 3. Consult. Strat. with Allies	State State State	3. To include Ministerials, Key Allies, NATO Permreps, Visits
March 10	1st IG meeting		
March 12	Draft Summit Decl. to USNATO	State	Must get out early if US to keep lead
March 15	Circulate for IG: 1. Draft cable to USNATO on Summit defense component 2. Draft Pres. ltr to NATO Heads of St/Govt	State/DOD State	
March 17	Meeting of IG or WG		
Wk of 3/15	Discussions with Hill on support for Summit (res/hrgs/studies, etc.)	NSC	May seek resolution supporting US position before and/or after Summit
March 19	Action Memo to Pres. on Summit Issues/Themes	State	
March 26	Action Memo to Pres. on sked and bilats	State	
April 5	Presidential ltr to NATO Heads of St/Govt	State	We will want to nail down US approach to Summit
April 9	Formal tasking for Summit preparations (brfg bks)	NSC/State/DOD	

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COMPLETION	TASK	RESPONSIBILITY	COMMENT
April 16	Status Rpt on DPC Min. preparations as they relate to Summit	DOD	Will be key meeting for agreement on defense aspects of Summit
April 23	Final decisions on sked/bilats		
April 27	Status Rpt on NAC Min. preparations as they relate to Summit	State	There is emerging consensus at NATO that Summit Declaration should be agreed by Ministers at Spring NAC
May 21	Final version of Summit scope paper	State	
May 24	Summit briefing books completed		
May 26	(As appropriate) Final drafts of President's Westminister and Bonn speeches	State	The Bonn speech will be key stage-setter for the Summit

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NATO SUMMIT: CALENDAR OF RELEVANT EVENTS

March 4	Instructed NATO Permreps exchange on Summit Declaration themes.
March 15	Congressional discussions begin.
March 19	Instructed Permreps exchange on draft Summit declaration.
March 22-24	NPG Ministerial, Colorado Springs.
April 5	Presidential letter to NATO Heads of State/ Government dispatched.
April 19-23	SPD Congress.
Late April	Possible MBFR Trilateral.
May 1	Completion of START interagency work.
May 6-7	DPC Ministerial, Brussels.
May 17-18	NAC Ministerial, Luxembourg.
May 21	Final version of Summit scope paper due.
June 1	Backgrounder on Summits for Washington Press Corps.
June 4-6	Versailles Economic Summit.
June 7	President's visit to Rome.
June 8-9	President's visit to London.
June 9-10	NATO Summit in Bonn.

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